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Abstract
This paper explores some cooperative aspects of investments in uncertain, real op-
tions. Key production factors are assumed transferable. They may reflect property
or user rights. Emission of pollutants and harvest of renewable resources are cases
in point. Of particular interest are alternative projects or technologies that provide
inferior but anti-correlated returns. Any such project stabilizes the aggregate pro-
ceeds. Therefore, given widespread risk exposure and aversion, that project’s worth
may embody an extra bonus.
The setting is formalized as a stochastic production game. Granted no economies
of scale such games are quite tractable in analysis, computation, and realization. A
core imputation comes in terms of contingent shadow prices that equilibrate com-
petitive, endogenous markets. The said prices emerge as optimal dual solutions to
coordinated production programs, featuring pooled resources - and also via adaptive
procedures. Extra value - or an insurance premium - adds to any project whose yield
is negatively associated with the aggregate.
Key words: investment, risk attitudes, insurance, covariance-pricing, cooperative
games, core, stochastic optimization.
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1 Introduction
The actual management of natural resources and ecosystems inspires great concerns
with sustainability and welfare. Notably, the possible depletion of shared stocks,
and the emission of harmful pollutants into commons, gives rise to legitimate worries
about efficiency and equity.
Typically the related industries must make heavy investments ex ante that can-
not easily be undone or recouped ex post. Also, net returns may be rather uncertain
in magnitude and somewhat distant in time.1 Together these facts beg for thorough
investment analysis, emphasizing precaution and the value of keeping options alive.
For such analysis, presuming relevant data, several disciplines have much to offer.
First, and maybe foremost, comes economics of finance and insurance. Second, since
one cannot avoid computation altogether, there is, in principle, no escape from
optimization theory. Third, and somewhat surprisingly, since exchanges may be
implicit or lurking in the background, so-called production (or market) games can
elucidate multi-agent interaction.
It is seldom though, to find all these ingredients in one and the same study. Most
analysts contend with the restricted perspective (and the partial analysis) that suits
a single agent, situated within well defined markets. Easily ignored then is the en-
dogenous nature of allocations and prices. Also troublesome is the possible absence
of markets for inputs, products or risks. Such absence greatly affects the willing-
ness to invest in large-scale projects, promising fairly unpredictable and ”belated”
dividends.
This paper deals with projects of precisely that sort. Besides, it accommodates
many agents, each acting in three roles: as consumer, investor and producer. At the
outset each owns a separate project, offering him uncertain returns. Our main pur-
pose is to ”compute” the total and marginal value of investing in those projects. As
will become clear, such values are interdependent, subject to contingencies, and de-
termined endogenously. Especially interesting are projects whose net returns swing
”out-of-phase” with the aggregate. Their yield is ”up” precisely when the total pro-
ceeds are ”down”. That convenient feature confers extra mark-ups on their values.
Technologies of such ”counter-cyclical” sort abound, but they tend to cost more.
Examples include:
*Economics Department, Bergen University, Norway
1Important references include [1], [2], [6], [7], [8], and [17].
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• selective gears for harvesting multi-species, multi-cohort fish stocks;
• diversification over crops and livestock, and ecological production in agriculture;
• electricity production based on wind, biomass or solar energy.
In each case the alternative technology is costlier to operate, but it better safeguards
the environment.
For more concrete examples consider two arrangements for electricity generation.
In the first, suppose all plants are driven by hydro-power. Some depend on highly
correlated, short term precipitation; they are well furnished in chilly, wet years.
Other, more expensive plants merely tap melting water under a glacier; they are
best off in warm, dry years. Given aggregate supply commitments, the two groups
can mutually insure each other. Such insurance ex post affects investments ex ante.
In the second arrangement, suppose the base load be delivered by thermal/nuclear
plants. Hydro-power then acts only as swing producer; it serves peak demand and
receives a marked-up price. Again, prudent investments will be affected throughout
the sector.
To study such features Section 2 introduces the prototypical agent. Section 3
places several of them into a two-stage, cooperative setting, affected by much uncer-
tainty. Brought out there are core solutions ex ante and ex post, both determined
by shadow prices. Section 4 offers some novel qualitative results, akin to covariance-
pricing in finance. Section 5 illustrates a few insights about parallel projects, and
Section 6 briefly discusses comparative risk advantages. Section 7 considers attain-
ment of equilibrium in environmental games, and Section 8 concludes.
This paper addresses at least three types of readers. Included are first, economists,
not quite aware of the rich opportunities production games offer, be it in positive or
normative way; second, finance/insurance analysts, little concerned with Lagrangian
duality; and finally, optimizers, not fully conversant with the cooperative aspects of
such duality.
2 The Risk-Exposed Agent
Considered here is a prototypical agent, being at once consumer, investor, and pro-
ducer. His decisions evolve step-wise as described next:
Right now install capacity or capital k.
; Next, observe the state ω ∈ Ω and a contingent resource endowment e(ω).
; Thereafter, adjust the capital stock by ∆k and acquire resources r.
; Go on to produce output f(k, ω,∆k, r).
; Finally, consume c and collect payoff pi(k, ω,∆k, r, c).
Often k ≤ k¯ where the prescribed upper bound k¯ reflects natural limits or some
historical right bestowed on the agent at hand. Examples are manifold. The table
below indicates some instances:
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

sector : choice k : threshold k¯ : uncertain ω or e(ω)
hydropower water reservoir environmental limit precipitation
fisheries catch capacity historical right stock abundance
pollution abatement capacity target level nature’s tolerance
agriculture density of lifestock regulation disease/pest


In any case, the realization ω remains unknown at the time when k is chosen. By
contrast, ∆k, r, c are contingent decisions; that is, they depend on the pair (k, ω).
At this point two modelling issues come up. The first concerns dimensionality,
the second uncertainty. Regarding the first, we may easily accommodate several
sorts of capacities, resources and products, increasing thereby the dimension of the
decision spaces. Doing so entails, in principle, no additional cost, be it in analysis
or presentation (albeit of course in computation).2 In fact, the reader may choose
freely whether to regard some items as vectors or real numbers. For intuition it
simplifies though, to deal merely with one-dimensional spaces.3
The second modelling issue concerns perception of risk and uncertainty. This
bears of course on what is known, unknown and unknowable [16]. We take a ”sim-
plistic” stand here, assuming that uncertainty amounts (and reduces) to a proba-
bilistic description of possible ω-values. Then, at one extreme end, one may posit
that the probability distribution of ω be known by each and every concerned party.
This hypothesis is certainly convenient, but hardly realistic. So, in lack of such
knowledge, at the other extreme (and decisively more realistic) end, one may have
to contend with sequential realizations of ω, and the attending build-up of empir-
ical statistics. We shall deal with both scenarios. In either case, E denotes the
expectation operator with respect to ω. To bypass purely technical concerns with
measurability and integrability, assume Ω finite. Also, attainment of extremal values
is tacitly assumed.
While still facing uncertainty, the agent wants to maximize the expectation of
his payoff pi(k, ω,∆k, r, c). If operating in autarchy, isolated from others, he should
maximize Epi(k, ω,∆k, r, c) subject to k ≤ k¯, r ≤ e(ω), c ≤ f(k, ω,∆k, r). (1)
Here and elsewhere we do not mention evident sign restrictions like k, r, c ≥ 0. Note
that problem (1) has two stages. First, k must be sunk before knowing ω. Second,
after ω and e(ω) are unveiled, the decision maker had better
maximize pi(k, ω,∆k, r, c) subject to r ≤ e(ω) and c ≤ f(k, ω,∆k, r).
Several sorts of uncertainty may prevail, be it in preferences, productivity, or re-
source abundance. Format (1) is generic and quite general, able to accommodate
manifold instances. In particular, if capital adjustment comes at prohibitive cost,
∆k is not mentioned. Similarly, when e is missing, r should be omitted.
2Indeed, when k, k¯ are vectors in the same space, c reside in another linear space, and r maybe
in a third, corresponding vector inequalities should be understood to hold componentwise. And,
juxtaposition of two compatible vectors then implies that the standard inner product be executed.
3In extremis, one may read this paper as dealing merely with financial markets.
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Admittedly, for realistic analysis, the planning horizon should extend beyond
two stages. It had better do so partly, because uncertainty is unveiled gradually,
over many steps - and partly, because there are repeated opportunities to take
recourse actions. Such complexity notwithstanding, if one is willing to work in
suitably high dimensions, problem format (1) is rich enough to comprise as many
stages and commodities as deemed necessary; see [12]. For our purpose it suffices
to think of all future intervals as compressed into a single second period. Doing so
simplifies things, and more so when several agents come on stage simultaneously - as
described in the next section. The short time horizon seems particularly appropriate
there because agents, who face substantial uncertainty, hesitate to make more than
limited contractual commitments into the future.
3 Stochastic Production Games
Accommodated henceforth is a fixed, finite set I of agents, each of the prototypical
sort just described. Agent i ∈ I proceeds step-wise, in the following order: First,
he installs capacity ki. Next, he observes ω and ei(ω). Thereafter, he makes capital
adjustment ∆ki, uses resource ri, and produces output fi(ki, ω,∆ki, ri). Finally, it
is time for him to consume ci and collect payoff pii(ki, ω,∆ki, ri, ci).
The interaction among several such agents is modelled next by various cooperative
games. Each such game associates a real value VS to every coalition S ⊆ I. The
mapping S 7→ VS is called the characteristic function of the game in question. A
payment scheme (ui) ∈ RI is then said to be in the core iff it entails
Pareto efficiency:
∑
i∈I ui = VI and
no blocking:
∑
i∈S ui ≥ VS for all S ⊂ I.
The efficiency constraint requires that the overall value VI be attained and fully
shared. The no blocking constraint captures that a dissatisfied coalition S, offered
merely
∑
i∈S ui < VS , would reject that proposal (or defect from the others).
Instead of autarchy, as described in Section 2, suppose now that the agents can
trade/exchange inputs and outputs among themselves. If kS := (ki)i∈S and ω are
given at the second stage, then coalition S can achieve ex post value
vS(kS, ω) := max
{ ∑
i∈S pii(ki, ω,∆ki, ri, ci) subject to∑
i∈S ri ≤
∑
i∈S ei(ω),
∑
i∈S ci ≤
∑
i∈S fi(ki, ω,∆ki, ri),
(2)
maximum taken with respect to (∆ki, ri, ci)i∈S. Ex ante the same coalition could
shoot for value
vS(k¯S) := max
{
EvS(kS, ω) :
∑
i∈S
ki ≤
∑
i∈S
k¯i =: k¯S
}
. (3)
Clearly, these values, be it VS = vS(kS, ω) or VS = vS(k¯S), are superadditive; that
is,
VS ≥ VS + VSS whenver S  S ⊆ I.
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This inequality indicates gains to be had by coordinating investment and consump-
tion. So we ask: Can all cooperative benefits be achieved? If so, in what manner?
Can some voluntary contract be instrumental? Is it easy to implement? And how
does it affect investment decisions in the first place?
Under some natural, standing assumptions all these questions have positive or
constructive answers - as will be brought out next. Those assumptions include that
for each ω the contingent functions pii, fi be concave in the other variables, and that
each pii be increasing in (ri, ci).
First-stage cooperation (3) anticipates that second-stage cooperation (2) will fol-
low. Such anticipation makes it natural to disentangle one from the other:
Proposition 1. (Ex post contingent core solutions) For the grand coalition S = I,
given capacity profile k := (ki)i∈I and realization ω, let Λr(k, ω), Λc(k, ω),be a La-
grange multipliers associated to the first and second constraint in (2). This means
that the standard Lagrangian L(k, ω,∆k, r, c, λ) :=∑
i∈I
{pii(ki, ω,∆ki, ri, ci) + λr [ei(ω)− ri] + λc [fi(ki, ω,∆ki, ri)− ci]} ,
after inserting λ := [λr, λc] = [Λr(k, ω),Λc(k, ω)] , should satisfy
max
∆k,r,c
L(k, ω,∆k, r, c, λ) ≤ vI(kI, ω). (4)
If so, the state-dependent payment scheme ui(k, ω) :=
max
∆ki,ri,ci
{pii(ki, ω,∆ki, ri, ci) + λr(k, ω) [ei(ω)− ri] + Λc(k, ω) [fi(ki, ω,∆ki, ri)− ci]}
belongs to the core of the second-stage, contingent game having characteristic func-
tion S 7→ vS(kS, ω), as defined in (2). When
∑
i∈I [ei(ω), fi(ki, ω, 0, ei(ω))] >> 0,
there do exist Lagrange multipliers. 
Let next
L(k, ω,∆k, r, c, λ,µ) := L(k, ω,∆k, r, c, λ) +
∑
i∈I
µ(k¯i − ki).
Proposition 2. (Ex ante core solution) For the grand coalition S = I, suppose
ω 7→ λr(ω), λc(ω) are Lagrange multiplier profiles associated to the first and second
constraint in (2), and that µ is associated to
∑
i∈I ki ≤
∑
i∈I k¯i =: k¯I . This means
that
max
(ki)
E max
∆k,r,c
L(k, ω,∆k, r, c, λ, µ) ≤ vI(k¯I). (5)
Then the payment scheme Ui(k¯i,
∑
j 6=i k¯j) :=
max
ki
E max
∆ki,ri,ci


pii(ki, ω,∆ki, ri, ci)+
λr(ω) [ei(ω)− ri] +
λc(ω) [fi(ki, ω,∆ki, ri)− ci] +
µ(k¯i − ki)

 (6)
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constitutes an overall core solution for the game having characteristic function S 7→
vS(k¯S), as defined in (3). If
∑
i∈I
[
ei(ω), fi(k¯i, ω, 0, ei(ω))
]
>> 0 almost surely, and
k¯I > 0, there do exist Lagrange multipliers ω 7→ λr(ω), λc(ω) and µ. 
One should not be lured into thinking that commonplace multipliers, furnished by
necessary optimality conditions for problems (2), (3), automatically generate core
imputations via (6). Rather, what imports here is that assumptions (4), (5) have
the nature of sufficient optimality conditions. To satisfy these it largely helps to
have pii, fi concave for each ω.
The above propositions, proven in Appendix, show how agents, having con-
vex preferences and stochastic assets, can pool inputs, outputs and endowments to
smoothen and insure individual payoffs across eventualities and time [14]. Individual
projects can thus share risks - and occasionally even eliminate them. In particular,
this holds when parties are few and risks idiosyncratic, so that neither the law of
large numbers nor the Arrow-Lind theorem apply [3]. The main instruments for
risk sharing are endogenous prices. These emerge as Lagrange multipliers, and they
equilibrate intrinsic markets [22]. At those markets all parties are construed as
price-takers.
One may rightly claim that Propositions 1&2 merely ”rediscover” - or, just apply
- known welfare properties of competitive equilibrium, stemming from its residence
within the core. That viewpoint is certainly useful, but not quite necessary. In
fact, Shapley-Shubik’s cooperative perspective on market games largely suffices [22].
Important and novel in that perspective is presence of two stages - and associated
recourse options, exercised as events unfold. Particularly interesting are differential
impacts of uncertainty on various projects. We address that issue next.
4 Covariance-Pricing of Projects
Let ∆kˆi, rˆi, cˆi denote optimal (so-called recourse) decisions, assumed unique and well
defined, in (6). Write briefly fi(ki, ω) for fi(ki, ω,∆kˆi, rˆi). The two terms λrei and
λcfi(ki) are in focus here. These record the reimbursements to i for his endowment
and output respectively. To inquire about the nature of these pecuniary items,
recall that two random variables X, Y are declared negatively dependent (or briefly
−dependent) if for all values x, y
Pr [X ≤ x, Y ≤ y] ≤ Pr [X ≤ x] Pr [Y ≤ y] .
Equivalently, there is negative dependence if Pr [X ≤ x|Y ≤ y] ≤ Pr [X ≤ x] . In
short, knowing Y small, reduces the likelihood that X also be small. Positive depen-
dence (briefly +dependence) obtains when Pr [X ≤ x, Y ≤ y] ≥ Pr [X ≤ x] Pr [Y ≤ y]
for all x, y.
Proposition 3. (Dependence and covariance [19]) If X, Y are negatively (posi-
tively) dependent and D : R→ R is strictly decreasing, then X,D(Y ) are oppositely
dependent, and the sign of cov(X, Y ) is −1 (+1 respectively). 
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The multipliers λr and λc in (6) are random, but depend also on the aggregate en-
dowment eI and output fI :=
∑
i∈I fi respectively. Ceteris paribus that dependence
shows up as ”inverse demand curves” eI 7→ λr(eI), fI 7→ λc(fI). It is commonplace
that such curves be decreasing. Not surprisingly, this property obtains here also:
Proposition 4. (Monotonicity of shadow prices) The inverse demand curves
eI 7→ λr(eI), fI 7→ λc(fI) are both decreasing. That is, almost surely
[eI − e¯I] [λr(eI)− λr(e¯I)] ≤ 0 whenever eI 6= e¯I, and (7)
[
fI − f¯I
] [
λc(fI)− λc(f¯I)
]
≤ 0 whenever fI 6= f¯I . (8)
Proof. The reduced Lagrangian function L(k, ω, λ) := max∆k,r,cL(k, ω,∆k, r, c, λ)
is concave with respect to eI and fI . Consequently, the corresponding partial deriva-
tives λr =
∂
∂eI
L(k, ω) and λc =
∂
∂fI
L(k, ω) are decreasing. 
Combining Proposition 3 with strict versions of inequalities (7), (8) we get:
Proposition 5. (Dependence between shadow prices individual supply) Quite nat-
urally suppose that the inverse demand curve eI 7→ λr(eI) be strictly decreasing.
Then, if eI, ei are one-sided dependent, λr, ei are oppositely dependent. So, if eI, ei
are ∓ dependent, then cov(λr, ei) has opposite sign, whence
E [λrei] > (<) E [λr]E [ei] .
In finance jargon, ∓dependence between eI, ei,confers a ”β-value” on ei of opposite
sign. In short ∓dependence, yields a corresponding ± bonus.
If fI 7→ λc(fI) is strictly decreasing, quite similar statements obtain for λc and fI .

If for example, under autarchy, standard present-value calculations proves project i
”in the money”, but fI , fi are positively dependent, then it better be fairly ”deep
in the money.” Ex ante ki is valued at the margin by the formula
E
∂
∂ki
[
pii(ki, ω,∆kˆi, rˆi, cˆi) + λc(ω)fi(ki, ω,∆kˆi, rˆi)
]
.
Enters here, as a separate part, the commonplace covariance format of pricing:
E
[
λc
∂
∂ki
fi(ki)
]
= E [λc]E
[
∂
∂ki
fi(ki)
]
+ cov
[
λc,
∂
∂ki
fi(ki)
]
.
5 Parallel Production
For illustration consider now a simple, tractable instance where project i contributes
a steady income flow ϕi over the time interval [0, Ti] . Since revenues are discounted
continuously at rate ρ > 0, that project furnishes present value
ϕi
∫ Ti
0
e−ρtdt =
ϕi
ρ
{
1− e−ρTi
}
.
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Let Ti := ri/ϕi where ri ≥ 0 denotes the amount of resources devoted to project i.
Consequently, presuming that capacity adjustment be impossible,
fi(ki, ω, ri) :=
ϕi
ρ
{1− exp [−ρri/ϕi]}
where ϕi = Φi(ki, ω) ≥ 0. For simple notation write ϕI :=
∑
i∈I ϕi. Also for sim-
plicity, take pii(ki, ω, ci, ri) = ci. Agent i receives endowment ei(ω) at the second
stage, this yielding aggregate eI :=
∑
i∈I ei. At that stage, given kS = (ki)i∈S and
ω, coalition S ⊆ I could achieve
vS(kS, ω) := max
(ri)
{∑
i∈S
fi(ki, ω, ri) :
∑
i∈S
ri ≤
∑
i∈S
ei(ω)
}
by pooling its members’ objectives, technologies, and endowments. Let λr(ω) ≥ 0 be
the Lagrange multiplier associated to
∑
i∈I ri ≤
∑
i∈I ei(ω). This state-dependent
shadow price should satisfy∑
i∈I
max
ri
{fi(ki, ω, ri) + λr(ω) [ei(ω)− ri]} ≤ vI(k, ω).
Simple calculations show that λr = exp(−ρeI/ϕI) hence λr is strictly decreasing in
eI , and Proposition 5 applies:
• If eI , ei are negatively (positively) dependent, then cov(λr, ei) has opposite sign.
Simple calculations also show that
• the aggregate endowment eI is distributed according to production flows; that is,
the optimal
rˆi =
ϕi
ϕI
eI.
Agents with relatively large ϕi will thus take substantial parts of eI. Such linear
sharing is known from mutual insurance when ϕi denotes the risk tolerance of agent
i; see [4], [19], [23]. The advantages of pooling not perfectly correlated risks are
evident. In fact, accidentally ”starving” agents are helped by more fortunate fellows.
The receivers will reciprocate once providence smiles to them. The resulting ex post
payment
ui(k, ω) := sup
ri
{fi(ki, ω, ri) + λr(ω) [ei(ω)− ri]}
gives the second-stage core solution. This payment has two terms: first, the pro-
duction part
fi(ki, ω, rˆi) = ϕi
∫ eI/ϕI
0
e−ρtdt;
second, the net financial transfer
λr [ei − rˆi] = e
−ρeI/ϕI
[
ei −
ϕi
ϕI
eI
]
.
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Since these transfers sum to zero, the second-stage, total value equals
∑
i∈I fi(ki, ω, rˆi).
As one might expect,
• the total ”cake” increases by cooperation:
∑
i∈I
fi(ki, ω, rˆi) = ϕI
∫ eI/ϕI
0
e−ρtdt >
∑
i∈I
ϕi
∫ ei/ϕi
0
e−ρtdt =
∑
i∈I
fi(ki, ω, ei).
The last inequality holds for all k and ω. It stems from
∫ T
0
e−ρtdt being strictly
concave in T. Therefore, by Jensen’s inequality
1
ϕI
∑
i∈I
ϕi
∫ ei/ϕi
0
e−ρtdt <
∫ eI/ϕI
0
e−ρtdt,
this attesting to the advantage of pooling resources. Uncertainty is likely to enforce
this feature, and especially so when all risks are idiosyncratic. To wit, for illustration,
• if each individual endowment ei is random, but their sum eI is not, the gains
from cooperation are twofold: They stem first, from substitutions and second, from
smoothing:
E
∑
i∈I
fi(ki, ω, rˆi) = ϕI
∫ eI/ϕI
0
e−ρtdt = ϕI
∫ ∑
i
Eei/ϕI
0
e−ρtdt
>
∑
i∈I
ϕi
∫ Eei/ϕi
0
e−ρtdt > E
∑
i∈I
ϕi
∫ ei/ϕi
0
e−ρtdt = E
∑
i∈I
fi(ki, ω, ei).
6 Comparative Risk Advantage
David Ricardo - studying international trade, scarce resources, and division of labor
- demonstrated that trading nations all gain by specializing in goods of comparative
advantages [5]. This section takes up a similar issue. Here however, merely one
good comes into play. Accordingly, one might expect that production largely and
best be undertaken by the most efficient agent. Under uncertainty this need not
be so. Indeed, rather inefficient producers may warrant premiums as suppliers of
stability and insurance. This feature becomes particularly pronounced when some
inefficient party’s risk is out of line with others.
To illustrate in a simple setting, assume there is no capacity limit (k¯i = +∞),
no capacity adjustments (∆ki = 0), and no endowment (ei = 0). Also, instead of
payoff consider cost Ci := −pii with
Ci(ki, ω, ci) = κiki + κ [di − ci]
+ . (9)
The operator [r]+ := max {0, r} preserves the positive part of the real number r.
The parameter di is construed as i′s ”inelastic demand”. If endogenous supply ci
falls short of demand di, the residual amount di−ci must be procured from external
sources at unit cost κ. Let
fi(ki, ω) = kiP
bi(ω)
i
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where the parameter Pi ∈ (0, 1) is prescribed, and bi(ω) ∈ {0, 1} is a binomial
variable. The latter takes the value 1 with probability pi ∈ [0, 1) , leaving then only
the proportion Pi of ki intact. With complementary probability p¯i := 1− pi, all of
ki remains productive. Under autarchy agent i will maximize expected cost
Emax
ci
Ci(ki, ω, ci) = κiki + κ
{
pi [di − Piki]
+ + p¯i [di − ki]
+}
with respect to ki. In that optic his best choice
ki =


0 if κi > κ {piPi + p¯i}
di if κpiPi ≤ κi ≤ κ {piPi + p¯i}
di/Pi if κi < κpiPi.
Next open up for cooperation; that is, for free trade. That opening will minimize
F (k) :=
∑
i∈I
κiki + κE
{
min
(ci)
∑
i∈I
[di − ci]
+ :
∑
i∈I
ci ≤
∑
i∈I
kiP
bi(ω)
i
}
with respect to (ki). Equivalently, trade minimizes
F˜ (k) :=
∑
i∈I
κiki + κE
{
min
(ci)
[∑
i∈I
(di − ci)
]+
:
∑
i∈I
ci ≤
∑
i∈I
kiP
bi(ω)
i
}
. (10)
Indeed, a minimizing (ci) in F (k) satisfies ci ≤ di for all i, whence
∑
i∈I [di − ci]
+ =[∑
i∈I(di − ci)
]+
and F˜ (k) ≤ F (k). Conversely, given a minimizing profile (c˜i)
in F˜ (k) there exists for each i a ci ≤ di such that
∑
i∈I ci =
∑
i∈I c˜i. Hence[∑
i∈I di − c˜i
]+
=
∑
i∈I [di − ci]
+ so that F (k) ≤ F˜ (k).
For the sake of transparency, suppose finally that there be only two agents.
Objective (10) then takes the reduced form
κ1k1 + κ2k2 + κE
[
d1 + d2 − k1P
b1(ω)
1 − k2P
b2(ω)
2
]+
. (11)
We assume κ1 < κ2 < κ and briefly discuss three cooperative cases next:
1) Absent uncertainty, when p1 = p2 = 0, we get k1 = d1 + d2 and k2 = 0. Then, to
no surprise, the most efficient agent produces all.
2) Only the efficient agent is at risk ; that is, p1 > 0, p2 = 0, in which case (11)
specializes to
κ1k1 + κ2k2 + κ
{
p1 [d1 + d2 − k1P1 − k2]
+ + p¯1 [d1 + d2 − k1 − k2]
+} .
Note that when total supply equals d1+ d2, the expected marginal production costs
are κ1−κ(p1P1+ p¯1) for agent 1 and κ2−κ for agent 2. If the latter is smaller, then,
somewhat surprisingly, the cost efficient agent better be inactive, leaving production
entirely to his high-cost associate (i.e. k1 = 0, k2 = d1 + d2). The latter is able to
compensate qua insurer for his own handicaps qua producer.
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3) Both are risk exposed, but in perfectly opposed manner ; that is, p1 > 0, p2 = 1−p1,
and b1(ω) + b2(ω) = 1. Then (11) reads
κ1k1 + κ2k2 + κ
{
p1 [d1 + d2 − k1P1 − k2]
+ + p2 [d1 + d2 − k1 − k2P2]
+}
The structure of the optimal solution is similar to the preceding case, but outside
procurement could become more attractive. In particular, if κ1 > κ(p1P1 + p¯1) and
κ2 > κ(p2P2 + p¯2), it is not worth anyone’s while to produce.
Nonsmooth objectives like (9), reflecting ”hit-or-miss” situations, inspire new
measures of risk, notably so-called Conditional Value-at-Risk [21].
7 Environmental Games and Quota Trade
As noted, the core imputation (6) reduces essentially to competitive equilibrium
in endogenous markets for capital and contingent commodities. One can hardly
presume that human-like players, holding imperfect information/competence, will
reach such equilibrium right away. More realistically, they must adapt and learn.
The classical branch of economics that deals with competitivemarkets, fails however,
to account for necessary adaptation and learning.
The simplicity of our setting invites reconsideration of these matters. But first
it is time to address a related question, already invoked, namely: to what extent
is uncertainty described or formalized? At this point the necessary prerequisites
are few and reasonable. To wit, suppose a discrete-time process ωt, t = 0, 1, ... of
independent random variates, all distributed as the underlying ω, can be simulated
or observed step by step. Then, since endowments and outputs are fixed ex post -
and since income effects are negligible or ignored - there should be good prospects
for reaching a stable equilibrium over time. Indeed, recent studies explore the con-
vergence of repeated, bilateral exchange towards an efficient steady state [9], [10],
[11], [15].
At this point the only coupling constraint kI :=
∑
i∈I ki ≤
∑
i∈I k¯i =: k¯I becomes
crucial. Suppose that k¯I reflects an aggregate upper bound on the catch of valuable
fish, say - or on the emission of greenhouse gases. Hence kI = k¯I holds throughout,
and payoffs pii(k¯I , ·) could depend on k¯I .
An environmental game thus unfolds in which players trade quotas ex ante and
contingent commodities ex post. While adjustment of quotas is sluggish, the other
variables are easily and quickly changed. So, to simplify, suppose that second-
stage markets clear ”instantaneously,” and that ∆ki = 0 there. As a by-product
this clearing generates Lagrange multipliers λc(ω). It also gives reduced functions
pii(ki, ω) := pii(ki, ω, rˆi, cˆi) and fi(ki, ω) := fi(ki, ω, rˆi, cˆi). Let st > 0 be a sequence
of step sizes selected a priori subject to
∞∑
t=0
st = +∞,
∞∑
t=0
s2t < +∞.
Begin at time t = 0, with s = s0, ω = ω0, ki = k¯i, and select two agents i, j ∈ I at
random. From there on the process could evolve iteratively as follows:
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• The two agents hold stocks ki and kj , respectively. Calculate their realized
marginal returns on capital:
mi :=
∂
∂ki
[pii(ki, ω) + λc(ω)fi(ki, ω)] , mj :=
∂
∂kj
[pij(kj , ω) + λc(ω)fj(kj , ω)] .
Transfer s(mi −mj) to i from j, this giving the two parties new holdings:
ki ← ki + s(mi −mj) and kj ← kj + s(mj −mi).
• Increase time t by 1, update s← st, and observe a new independent ω ← ω
t.
• Continue to pick pairs of agents until convergence.
Convergence obtains as in [9], [10], [15]. Note that trade is voluntary and driven
by perceived prospects for mutual improvements. It happens out of equilibrium, uses
money as instrument, and requires no private information to be revealed. While still
away from equilibrium, the price - and the associated monetary compensation - that
goes along with a bilateral exchange could result from bargaining. If so, it would be
hard to predict, but depend on the difference, as reflected in mi −mi, between i′s
willingness to buy and sell [18].
8 Concluding Remarks
While the preceding model were expressly stylized, extensions can easily incorporate
much realism and detail. But the simple version brings out already that stochastic
production (or market) games offer manifold opportunities to put much of economic
theory, applied mathematics and computer science jointly to good use. A fortiori
this holds in quasi-markets or market-like settings affected by sequential decisions
and much uncertainty. Several theories, and attending practices, then come on
stage simultaneously. And they supplement each other. Included are finance, in-
surance, stochastic optimization and Mont Carlo simulation. These disciplines have
complementary concerns and perspectives. Together they facilitate a rich analysis
- be it positive or normative - of how players would/should fare. Particularly im-
portant is absence or incompleteness of markets. Internal exchanges, of perfectly
Walrasian sort, may then provide some mitigation. Presence of public goods/bads -
or widespread externalities - need not preclude coordination and relative efficiency.
Troublesome though, are economies of scale in which case Lagrange multipliers may
not exist [12].
Especially important are concerns with expandability and reversibility of capac-
ity choice [1], [2], [6], [7], [8], [17]. Such concerns could also be studied within the
frames of stochastic production games. In particular, these allow estimates of the
value of perfect information [20].
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Recall that any bivariate, real-valued function L(ξ, λ)
satisfies
min
λ
max
ξ
L(ξ, λ) ≥ max
ξ
min
λ
L(ξ, λ).
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(This inequality, named weak duality in optimization theory, reflects the last-mover
advantage in zero-sum, two-person, noncooperative games.) In the present context,
at the second stage, given k = (ki) and ω, let ξ := (∆ki, ri, ci)i∈S, and associate the
contingent Lagrangian
LS(ξ, λ) :=
∑
i∈S
{pii(ki, ω,∆ki, ri, ci) + λr [ei(ω)− ri] + λc [fi(ki, ω,∆ki, ri)− ci]}
to coalition S. Note that
min
λ≥0
LS(ξ, λ) =
∑
i∈S
pii(ki, ω,∆ki, ri, ci)
if
∑
i∈S ri ≤
∑
i∈S ei(ω) &
∑
i∈S ci ≤
∑
i∈S fi(ki, ω,∆ki, ri); otherwise the minimal
value equals −∞. Consequently,
max
ξ
min
λ≥0
LS(ξ, λ) = vS(kS, ω).
When Λ ≥ 0 is a Lagrange multiplier, coalition S will not block the proposed
payment scheme because∑
i∈S
ui(k, ω) = max
ξ
LS(ξ,Λ) ≥ min
λ≥0
max
ξ
LS(ξ, λ) ≥ max
ξ
min
λ≥0
LS(ξ, λ) = vS(kS, ω).
In particular,
∑
i∈I ui(k, ω) ≥ vI(k, ω). Since the converse inequality holds by as-
sumption, Pareto efficiency also obtains. When eI(ω) and
∑
i∈I fi(ki, ω, 0, ei(ω)) are
both positive, the Slater condition holds - hence existence of multipliers is ensured.

Proof of Proposition 2: Associate here another Lagrangian LS :=∑
i∈S
{
pii(ki, ω,∆ki, ri, ci) + λr [ei(ω)− ri] + λc [fi(ki, ω,∆ki, ri)− ci] + µ(k¯i − ki)
}
to coalition S. Note that
min
µ≥0
Emin
λ≥0
LS = E
∑
i∈S
pii(ki, ω,∆ki, ri, ci)
if
∑
i∈S ri ≤
∑
i∈S ei(ω) &
∑
i∈S ci ≤
∑
i∈S fi(ki, ω,∆ki, ri) almost surely, and∑
i∈S ki ≤
∑
i∈S k¯i; otherwise the minimal expected value equals −∞. Consequently,
still writing ξ = (∆ki, ri, ci)i∈S,
max
k
min
µ≥0
Emax
ξ
min
λ≥0
LS = vS(k¯S).
When Λ, µ are Lagrange multipliers, coalition S will not block the proposed payment
scheme (Ui) because
∑
i∈S Ui =
max
k
Emax
ξ
LS(Λ, µ) ≥ min
µ≥0
max
k
Emin
λ≥0
max
ξ
LS ≥ max
k
min
µ≥0
Emax
ξ
min
λ≥0
LS = vS(k¯S).
In particular,
∑
i∈I Ui ≥ vI(k¯I). Since the converse inequality holds by assumption,
Pareto efficiency again obtains. The presumed positivity guarantees that the Slater
condition holds. 
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